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PRESER VA TION OF SAND DUNES
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will require ascertainment of those lands not owned by the state and
studies to determine priorities of acquisition. New legislation must be
developed and all environmental-protection legislation must be
efficiently enforced by the appropriate state agencies. Every effort must
be made to increase the efficiency of municipal and industrial facilities.
Heavy penalties similar to those imposed by the Vermont legislature s
may be necessary to prevent private citizens from polluting. Above all,
there is a need for total environmental planning in the uses to be
permitted of our estuarine zone. We must endeavor to determine realistic
long-term uses that are not destructive to the estuarine environment and
to limit development to those non-degradatory uses."
KENNETH W. PARSONS

Environmental Law-The Public Trust Doctrine: A Useful Tool in the
Preservation of Sand Dunes
The problem of preventing the destruction of sand dunes by private
interests should be of grave concern to North Carolina citizens. Indeed,
the problem has been recognized by a specific statutory finding that the
North Carolina coast "is wholly or in part protected from actions of the
Atlantic Ocean and storms thereon by a system of natural or
constructed dunes."' Our present statutes provide that
it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation in any manner
to damage, destroy, or remove any sand dune, or part thereof, lying
along the outer banks of this State . . . or to kill, destroy, or remove
any trees, shrubbery, grass, or other vegetation growing on sand dunes,
without first having obtained a permit as specified herein authorizing
2
such proposed damage, destruction, or removal.
Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor resulting upon conviction in
the imposition of a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not more than
3
500 dollars.
-See note 22 supra.

"North Carolina has laid the basis for such planning. See
CORPORATION,

'N.C.

A

COASTAL ZONE RESOURCES

PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR THE NORTH CAROLINA ESTUARY STUDY

(rev. 1970).

GEN. STAT. § 104B-3 (Supp. 1969).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-4 (Supp. 1969).
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-12 (Supp. 1969).
'See Morgan, On the Legal Aspects of North CarolinaCoastal Problems, 49 N.C.L. REv.
857, 864 (1971).
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Unfortunately, an administrative approach has not resolved the
problem that many coastal property owners now face.4 Consider the
following example: X Corporation buys fifty acres of land fronting on
the Atlantic Ocean and proceeds to build a large beach-front motel. To
enhance the view for the motel guests and make access to the ocean
easier, the corporation begins removing the sand dunes along its
property. If X Corporation is able to obtain the requisite permit from
the county board of commissioners, can the neighboring property
owners bring an action in a North Carolina state court to prevent the
removal of the dunes, and, if so, on what theory? The purpose of this
note is to suggest that in appropriate cases the attorney general should
intervene on behalf of neighboring property owners even after authority
for removal has been granted by the county board, and that the "public
trust" doctrine can be used to justify that intervention. In fact, resort to
the doctrine is required to protect the public interest from the shortsighted administrative decisions that high-pressure tactics yield. One
commentator has noted that
public officials are frequently subjected to intensive representations on
behalf of interests seeking official concessions to support proposed
enterprises. The concessions desired by those interests are often of
limited visibility to the general public so that public sentiment is not
aroused; but the importance of the grants to those who seek them may
lead to extraordinarily vigorous and persistent .efforts. It is in these
situations thdt public trust lands are likely to 6e put in jeopardy and
that legislative watchfulness is likely to be at the lowest levels. 5
One of the early landmark cases in the development of the public
trust doctrine was Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,6 which
involved a statute enacted by the Illinois state legislature to revoke a
prior grant of nearly the entire Chicago water front to the Illinois
Central Railroad. In upholding the revocation, the Court noted that
[tihe harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State
of Illinois in the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing
commerce; and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State of
control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a
private corporation created for a different purpose, one limited to
'Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471,495 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
'146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and the
city, is a proposition that cannot be defended. 7
This early public trust case falls far short of justifying the North
Carolina Attorney General in seeking an injunction to prevent removal
of sand dunes by a private corporation on private property. However,
North Carolina does have some case history which could be used as a
basis for development of the public trust doctrine. In 1903, the North
Carolina Supreme Court decided Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic
Hotel.8 Therein the court recited. with favor the following declaration
from Illinois CentralRailroadCo.:
The State can no more abdicate its trusts over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them,
so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties
• . . than it can abdicate its police power in the administration of
government and the preservation of peace. So with trusts connected
with public property orpropertyof a special character,like lands under
navigable waters, they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction
and control of the State?
Shepard's Point Land Co. clearly provides a foundation for the use of
the public trust doctrine in North Carolina. Other states, including
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California, have developed and refined
the use of this doctrine. For example, the Massachusetts courts have
avoided direct confrontation with the legislature, but have in many
instances been successful in protecting public lands. Professor Sax says
of the Massachusetts approach: "The court has served notice to all
concerned that it will view with skepticism any dispositions of trust lands
and will not allow them unless it is perfectly clear that the dispositions
have been fully considered by the legislature."'" In Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Commission," the Massachusetts Supreme Court prevented
a state agency from permitting a publicly preserved natural forest to be
turned into a ski resort, remarking that it found "no express grant to the
Authority of power to permit use of public lands. . . for what seems, in
2
part at least, a commercial venture for private profit."'
7

1d. at 454.

8132 N.C. 517,44 S.E. 39 (1903).
11d. at 527-28, 44 S.E. at 42 (emphasis added).

"Sax 502.
"350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
1"Id. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
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According to Professor Sax, "[t]he Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has probably made a more conscientious effort to rise above rhetoric
and to work out a reasonable meaning for the public trust doctrine than
have the courts of any other state." 13 In Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land
& Improvement Co.' 4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
[I]f the state had power. . . to convey and relinquish. . . all its right,
title, and interest in and to all lands lying within the limits of Muskego
Lake, then it may, in a similar manner, convey and relinquish to
private persons or corporations all such right, title, and interest in and
to every one of the 1,240 lakes in Wisconsin."9
City of Milwaukee v. State 6 affords a clear description of the trust
aspect of the public trust doctrine:
The trust reposed in the State is not a passive trust; it is
governmental, active, and administrative. .

.

. The equitable title to

these submerged lands vests in the public at large, while the legal title
vests in the State. .... 17
Professor Sax cites several California cases which show the
reluctance of California courts to overrule express legislative
enactments. However, he does cite one interesting section from the
California Government Code:" "The Legislature hereby finds and
declares that the public interest in the San Francisco Bay is in its
beneficial use for a variety of purposes; that the public has an interest in
the bay as the most valuable single natural resource of an entire
region ..
"20
Thus, other states do not hestitate to use the public trust doctrine to
protect certain types of land after administrative safeguards have failed.
In most of the public trust cases, the land involved has been state-owned
land which had been either sold to or put under control of private

interests. With respect to the protection of sand dunes, the public trust
doctrine is clearly relevant when the dunes are located on publicly owned
beaches. However, in many instances the dunes are located on property
'3Sax 509.
193 Wis. 534,67 N.W. 918 (1896).
'11d. at 551, 67 N.W. at 922.
"1193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).
'71d. at 449, 214 N.W. at 830.
SSee Sax 524-38.
"Id. at 532 &n. 185.
2CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 66600 (West 1966).
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that has been in private hands for many years. Can the public trust
doctrine be used to prevent removal of dunes that are on private
property? Both Illinois Centr4l Railroad Co. and Shepard's Point Land
Co. speak of property of a "special character" which cannot be placed
entirely beyond the direction and control of the state. Recently, in
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach,2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the peculiarly public nature
of lands on which sand .dunes are located. The court declared:
"Manifestly, the purpose [of building the sand wall] was the
preservation and protection of the Town of Carolina Beach from the
fury of the sea rather than the reclamation of the lands of private owners
along the beach." 2 Sand dunes are one of the few natural protections
from high wind and water damage. Surely the "special character" of the
small strips of land on which sand dunes are located justifies state
control of them.
According to Professor Sax, there is a "rule of water law that one
does not own a property right in water in the same way he owns his
watch or his shoes, but that he owns only an usufruct-an interest that
incorporates the needs of others.' 23 This same concept should be
extended to include those who own property that contains sand dunes. A
further insight into the nature of lands that have a "special public
character" is revealed in Yates v. Milwaukee,24 which was quoted with
approval by the North Carolina court in Shepard's Point Land Co.2 In
Yates, the United States Supreme Court said: "This riparian right is
property, and is valuable, and, though it must be enjoyed in due
subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or
capriciously destroyed1 or impaired. ' 26 The same rule should apply to
those who own littoral rights in coastal property.
It is and always has been difficult to get a "sympathetic ear" when
private property rights are affected. However, notwithstanding the
resistance of private owners, the attorney general should be armed with
legal tools to protect the public interests. The concept of the public trust
doctrine -can be utilized as a vital back-up to established administrative
21277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).

2Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517.
2Sax 485.
2477 U.S. (10 Wa1l.)497 (1870).

2*132 N.C. at 379, 44 S.E. at 45.
277 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 504 (emphasis added).
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safeguards. In order to counteract the pressure brought to bear upon
administrative agencies by private groups to secure permits to remove
dunes, in appropriate situations the North Carolina Attorney General's
Department should use the public trust doctrine to protect coastline
property. Although the guidelines should be spelled out in specific terms
by our legislature, the attorney general should not hesitate to invoke the
doctrine as enunciated in the case law.
FRANK

B.

JACKSON

Environmental Law-Water Resources-Zones of Shared Conservation
Authority and United States Public Policy
The exercise of conservation authority must be understood in the
context of the conservation movement as a living and evolving ethic in
the American conscience. Many writers trace the emergence of the
conservation movement as a real force in the United States to the
Governor's Conference of 1908 called by President Roosevelt and the
subsequent work of the National Conservation Commission.'
In the beginning, this movement generated a great unity of purpose
and direction. The Commission's scientists focused the laws of man on
the laws of nature. The Commission itself contributed the concept of
resource management to the movement by publishing an inventory of the
nation's resources. Yet as the movement grew it began to fragment, for
one of its essential characteristics was the propensity to attract
exceptionally diverse groups. Those who placed nature's highest values
in the aesthetics marched to the cause alongside the sportsmen, the
lumbermen, the developers, and other groups who understood nature's
utility value. While each group could agree on the general concept of
conservation, their specific interests conflicted.
William Howard Taft, who followed Roosevelt into office, once
remarked that conservation was such an abstruse subject that many
people were for it no matter what it meant.2 His remark captured the
essential weakness of the movement. In the eyes of the political scientist,
the form of the classic political struggle-which is the basic ingredient of
the democratic process-surfaced in the conflict of the group interests:
'See, e.g., N.

2

WENGERT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON CONSERVATION 8 (1951).

22 (1955).

